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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of th.e

STATE OF UTAH
Case No. 8740

------------0-----------REx HoLLAND; REx HoLLAND, AdministTator with the Will
.A.nnexecl of the:. Estate of J OH:K G. HoLLAND, Deceased,
Plai1tti ff s and A tJpellants,
vs.
ARTHUR

JYioRE.TON, ETHEL T. MoRETON, also known as
E. T. 1\1oRETON, JoHN R. :J·foRETON, also known as J. R.
1\IoREToN, RosE ANN P. ~!IoRETON, SusAN JYioRETON TEvrs,
Defendants and Respondents.
E.

------------0------------

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
(Note: Numbers in parentheses 1·efer to pages of
the record. The parties will be referred
to here as they appeared in the Trial Court.
Thus, .A.ppellants' original brief will be referred to as ''Pl. Br.' ~ and Respondents'
Brief as '' Dfts. Br.'' .A.ll emphasis, unless
otherwise indicated, will be supplied.)

Preliminary Remarks
Defendant Arthur E. ~Ioreton is completely unmasked by
his own brief. In it he indulges in complete misst~atements
of the law, of the Record, and of Plaintiffs' position. Although the trial court rendered no opinion and never ex-
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plained its action/ he indulges in unwarranted and. invalid
speculation as to what were the trial court's reasons for
its action. In desperation, he even resorts to the cus~tomary
refuge of the wrongdoer and charges his victim with extortion and perjury ( Dfts. Br. 33, 41, 59).
Notwithstanding all this, it is inescapable-even on the
basis of his own brief-that )ioreton ha.s been guilty of
professional misconduct of the most reprehensible sort. It
is further inescapable that, in dismissing the action of
Rex HolLand (both individually and as Administrator)
against Defendants Ethel T., John R. and Rose Ann P.
Moreton, and Sus~n Moreton Tevis, and in granting Defendant Arthur E. :\1oreton's motion for a directed verdict
and entering a judgment for Defendant Arthur E. Moreton,
notwithstanding the verdict of the jury, the trial court committe~d serious error.
The error is particularly ag·grava ted in this case, in
that it appears that the trial court failed to apply to this
case not only the lav\; applicable to actions involving a confidential relationship, but also failed to apply important
rules as to the relationship of ~ittorney and Client announced by this Court and all other courts, ''founded upon
principles of public policy'' and designed to ''serve various
purposes, among them to prevent the dishonest practitioner
from fraudulent conduct * * * and to foster respect for the
profession and the courts * * *.' ~ J/alia v. Giles. 100 Utah
562, 114 P. 2nd 208, 212; Gillette Y. A'euJzouse Realty Co.,
75 Utah 13, 282 P. 776, 779.
1

Except that as to his distnissal of the action by Rex Holland,
as Adn1inistrator ~ Judge Hanson tnentioned a one-year statute of
limitations. Sec. 78-12-37 (see Pl. Br. 58-59) and lack of proper
authorization (see Pl. Br. 60-61).
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Even under Defendants' own version of the facts (which
the jury obviously found was not the true version), and eiVen
under Defendants' own version of the law (which is not the
applicable version), the action of thP trial court was
not justified and was e1Toneous as a matter of law.

I.
Replying to Defendants' Contention That There
Was No Confidential Relationship (Dfts. Br.
Point I)

(a)
'' *~

The general meaning of the term 'practice
law' or 'practice of la\v' is common knowledge,
although the boundaries of its definition may be indefinite * : :, * it is not confined to performing services
,x, * * in courts of justice :\{: ~"' 'x· it i.ncludes * * * the
prepa.ration of legal instrzunents and contracts, by
which legal rights are secured * * *." 7 C. J. 8.
Attorney and Client, Sec. 3g, p. 703.
''The vvord 'attorney' signifies in its broadest
sense a substitute or agent ;r,. * ,:.c.'' 7 C. J. 8. Attorney and Client, Sec. 1, p. 702.
''Generally speaking the relation of an attorney
and client is a matter of contract * * *. Thus the
contract of emplo;I}Jnent t'n general consists of an
offer or request by the client anrl an acceptance or
assent by the attorney) or of an offer by the a.ttorney
and acceptance of the offer by the client * * 'r.. The
contract m.a.u be express or implied, and it is sufficient tha.t the advice ond assistarnce of the attorney
is sought and receiued in 1natters pertinent to his
profession." 7 C. J. /{Attorney a.nd Client, Sec. 65,
p. 848.
,r.: ::-:,

We have previously listed some 15 separate legal documents which were prepared by the defendant Moreton for
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use in connection with the acquisition and transfer of the
various interests involved in this litigation (see- Pl. Br. pp.
22-23). ThHre is no que~tion but that these were documents
''by which legal rights aTe secured.'' Moreton himself
testified that these documents were absolutely binding"
(R. 593). 2
All of these documents were of course prepared by
Moreton following his first meeting· with the co-owners in
the Spring (April) of 1946, when :\Ioreton made an offer
to serve as the attorney for the the,n co-owners of theM &
H claims in patenting those claims and in selling those
claims, and when his offer to that effect was fully and completely accepted by the Plaintiffs-thereby creating beyond
question the contract of employment, and giving rise to
the Attorney-and-Client relationship. Thus testifying as
to this very first meeting between Plaintiffs and l\Ioreton
(R. 331 to 337)-the date of which ''as firmly fixed as a
result of repeated interruptions from Defendant's Counsel
As indicated, the trial court rendered no opinion setting forth
the reasons underlying its action. However, some clue or explanation as to what caused it to commit such serious error in a case so
affected with public interest may, perhaps. be suggested by the -following (R. 595-596):
"Q. (By 1\Ir. Pollack)*** I forget \vhat your answer was
with respect to whether these \vere l~o-al documents that you
drew?
l\1r. Gustin: \Vhat do you mean by that? We object to
the fonn of the question. 'Legal documents has a connotation that \vould cover every \vriting e.,"(cept regarding a book.
Mr. Pollack: * * * I think the e.~pression 'legal documents'
has a well recognized connotation.
Mr. Gustin: Your Honor, I object to it.
The Court: Rephrase your question. It is confusing to me,
Mr. Pollack.
Mr. Gustin: That is, I don't believeThe Court: The objection is sustained."
2
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as being in the S.pring (April) of 1946 (R.
Holland stated as foUows (R. 337):

334-335~),

Reoc

"He (Moreton) told us at that time (the time of
the first conversation; i.e., the Spring of 1946) that
he, \Vhen \Ve started on this patent, that he would be
our attorney, that he \vould be our attorney in getting the patent and that he \Vould also be, our attorney in the sale of these properties.''

This testimony was never denied. Moreton, In all
the days he wa.s on the stand, never denied that at the
very first meeting in April 1946 he had told Plaintiffs he
was going to be their attorney in getting the patent and
in selling the properties. 3
(b)
In their brief, Defendants completely ignore such evidence as the foregoing, which is clear and undisputed on the
a Rex Holland and the defendant Moreton, of course, both testified that every time there was a conversation, everything was reduced
to writing (R. 318-319, 592). Thus, that testimony, taken together
with the uncontradicted testimony of Rex just quoted, clearly sustained a finding that the employ,ment contract entered into at this first
meeting between M:oreton and his clients and giving rise to the
Attorney-Client relationship, had in fact been reduced to writing
and was actually contained in the first legal document which the
defendant Moreton prepared-the first Option Agreement of the
Spring of 1946. Plaintiffs, of course, as even the defendant Moreton
was forced to adtnit, were never given and have never had a copy
of this docutnent ( R. 335, 657-658). And Moreton (who produced
every scrap of paper he felt would be helpful to him) now clain1s
he has "lost" the original ( R. 612-615) . He was unable to tell when
he first noticed it was "missing" from his files (R. 615). Significant!)')
he did not even atte1npt any explanation of how or why it was that.
of all the documents he himself prepared and kept) this 1nost critical
docuntent-the first option-'was the only one that 'ltras ((missing)).
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Record. They urge that there was no Attorney-Client relationship and not Hven a Principal-and-Agent relations·hip,
ignoring that More,ton himself testified that therH were no
negotiations for the sale of Plaintiffs' interest in the M & H
propertie:S other than the negotiations carried on onJy
through Moreton (R. 821). They argue that all the docume·nts drawn by Moreton did not require the particular
skill of an attorney and could have been drawn by the
Hollands and Murie themselves (Dfts. Br. 32), ignoring
the fact that practically every legal document-e.g., Wills,
Contracts, Leases, etc.-can theoretically and within the
realm of possibility be dra~vn by a layman, but that nevertheless the public at large generally recognizes that it is
be~tter to employ and does employ a lawyer for the preparation of such documents; and that, as indicated, the preparation of such docwnents constitutes ''the practice of law.''
They even ignore the fact that Moreton himself recognized
Plaintiffs were lacking in the necessary skill for preparing
such documents, whe~n on July 5, 1936, he wrote them
(R. 644) that:
"It is important that you advise me promptly by
return mail, and if you have received the notices
(Notices of Exemption) back again from the Recorder, please fo'ru;arrl then~ to ,n~e, so tha,t I may see
that they are in proper fottJn." 4
In this san1e letter of July 5, 1946 Moreton warned and instructed
the co-owners against discussing their price for their property with
anyone else and told them to leave such matters entirely up to him
(R. 640-641, 644). This letter was produced at Moreton's deposition
and quoted in full therein but Moreton did not produce it at the
trial ( R. 637). Thus, its contents were placed on the record only
upon Moreton being confronted ·with his deposition ( R. 636-644).
4
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Defendants also ignore the fact that when Moreton wrote
to the co-owners, he wrote them on his legal statione~ry,
holding himself out as an attorney -at-law ( R. 660-661) ; and
that Rex-in his lettHr to H. L. Waldthausen, Jr., the mining engineer for Kais,er Steel (Ex. D. 36)-Teferred in
capital letters to Moreton a's the
"ATTORNEY

AT

LAvv,

JUDGE

BuiLDING,

SALT LAKE

U TAI-I, who \Vill handle all busine,ss connected
vvith the sale of this property.'' (R. 470)
CITY,

Defendants even ignore the fact that in about August,
1947, Moreton advised Plaintiffs as to the giving of a rig-ht
of way to the U n~on Pacific over other properties bH1onging to Plaintiffs and adjoining the M & H claims (R. 3673,68) ; and that Moreton at the trial claimed credit for procuring a release in Novembe-r, 1948 from one Arthur (Ex. D.
50), thus settling· a piece of threatened litigation involving
an alleged cloud upon Plaintiffs' title to the M & H properties (R. 418, 593, 77 4); and that Moreton himself testified
that in October, 1948 he had received an a.bstr~act of the
title to Plaintiffs' property and that he had examined the
title and passed on it (R. 792).

(c)
While Defendants' Brief ignores the~se matters by not
mentioning the·m, Defendants seek to deny them any effect
or significance by erroneouS'ly arguing that the Attorne,yClient relationship is unimportant unless it is. shown that
the relationship existed at the time the very first Option
Agreement was made, in the Spring of 1946 (Dft. Br. 26,
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33, 38) ; that otherwise eve~rything that occurred in thH first
conversation in the Spring of 1946 was nothing more than
a simple business transaction ( Dfts. Br. 27, 28, 29, 36, 39,
42); that Moreton's entire oom.p·ensation was fixed at that
time (Dfts. Br. 31, 42) and since there was no AttorneyClient relationship existing when such compensation was
fixed, Moreton was under no fiduciary obligation to his
clie,nts and was entitled to drive the best bargain he could
(Dfts. Br. 34, 35, 42).
In the cours.e of this erroneous contention, Defendants
are guilty of what appear to be important and deliberate
dis.tortions of the Record. Thus Defendants state (Dfts.
Br. 33) that the initial conversation between Plaintiffs and
Moreton which Rex Holland testified to (quoted above),
giving rise to Moreton's employment as Plaintiff's attorney,
took place not in April of 1946 but in March, 1947.
No plainer misst~tement is conceivable. The line of
questioning during which Rex Holland testified about Moreton's offer to act as Plaintiffs' attorney, and their acceptance of that offe~r, begins with line 8 on page 331 of the
Record and continue·s to line 26 on page 337. It is crystalclear, throughout, that Rex is being questioned about the
very first meeting with Moreton in the Spring of 1946.
This appears not only at the very outset of the line of
que·stioning (R. 331) but at other points as well (R. 334,335,
336, 337). It is hard to believe Defendants' counsel could
be confus:e:d on this s.core, since his frequent intel'Tuptions
to .the que.s-tioning we1·e helpful in firmly fixing the date
of the conversation involved in the testimony as being in
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the Spring (April) of 1946 (R. 334, lines 22 to 27; R. 334,
line 29, to R. 335, line< 1, and R. 335, line-s 14 to 16). 5
Defendants' second important misstatement of thH Record in their attempt to avoid the effe:et of the undisputed
evidence as to the confidential relationship- lie-s. in Defendants' va.rious statements and sugge~stions. and innuendos
throughout their brief ( Dfts. Br. 31, 32, 33, 35, 50, 51), that
the price of $100,000 was placed upon Plaintiffs' interest
in the M & H claims at the very first meeting of Plaintiffs
and defendant Moreton, in the Spring of 1946, at a time when
the parties, according to Defendants, we·re de~aling· '' a,t
arms' length'' and that, therefore, this price was not influenced by the existence of any confidential relationship
of attorney and client or principal and agent, and cannot
be upset because at some· later date such a confidential
relationship may have be.en created (Dfts. Br. 40). This
again, of course, is in the· te.e!th of the Reeord.
Rex Holland testified that the option drawn in More<ton 's
own hand at the very firs.t meeting in the Spring of 1946, was
left blank in two important res.pects: No time was fixed
for its exe.rcise, and no price was fixed (R. 333 to 337).
Rex pointed out as to the price, that it was left blank hecause, as Moreton explained to them when Moreton in his
own hand wrote out this ''lost'' option of April 1946, ''he
5

Defendants' misstatement in this respect is, of course gratuitous
and, actually, of no legal significance. Since none of the options
given, including those given prior to March of 1947, were ever exercised, ·either by April 1947 or thereafter (R. 628, 664-665, 682-683),
it makes little difference whether or not the Attorney-Client relationship was entered into in April 1946 or March 1947, because in either
event it existed on the critical date of December 20, 1948 when
Plaintiffs-as the result of Defendants' fraud-were induced to part
with their property and suffer their damage.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

(Moreton) did not know at that time just what value this
property had'' (R. 337). In fact, according to Rex (R.
341-346) no price was fixed or eve-n mentioned un.til a mee~t
ing which Rex de-finitely identified as occurring on March
10, 1947 because the power of attorney (P. Ex. 8) which
Moreton got the Plaintiff:s to give him at the same time was
dated March 10, 1947 ( R. 345). It was at that March 1947
meeting, Rex sai.d, that price was first discussed and that
Moreton told them that, because of the overburden, the most
they could get was ten cents a ton; on which basis, an overall
price of $133,000 was fixed-$33,000 for Moreton's 14 interest and $100,000 for the other% (R. 343-344).
Aside from Moreton's testimony (R. 623-625) about the
price being contained in the ''lost'' option, 6 all other evidence and testimony of every witness including Moreton
confirms and supports Rex's testimony that the, price was
not contained in the original option for the reason that
no one in the Sp,ring of 1946 knew the value of the propThe record thoroughly justifies the suspicion that this "lost''
option was really not lost. It justifies the suspicion that Moreton
must have seen this document at least shortly before his deposition.
Thus, while Moreton claims never to have seen the document since
it was originally drawn (R. 615) he was, nevertheless, years later
both at his deposition and at the trial, able to fix the date of it and
of his first meeting with Plaintiffs as being April 6, 1946 (R. 610,
lines 14-17; R. 620, lines 18-30) He attempted to explain this feat
of memory by reason of a reference he claimed was contained in
the option of September 1. 1946, Ex. P. 4 (R. 620-621). But even
this explanation was exposed at the trial when l\Ioreton's own chief
counsel (apparently una·ware of the real significance of ·what he was
doing) took up some four pages of the Record in pointing out thart
the option of September 1. 1946, produced and put in evidence at
the trial, contains no reference to the .L~pril 6th date or to any other
date of any earlier meeting or document. option or otherwise (R.
615 ..619).
6
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erty. No document was produced at the trial or at any
deposition dated any earlie:r than July 1947 in which the
price $100,000 appears. Thus the option of Seiptember 1,
1946 does not re.fe,r to the $100,000 figure. or to any figure
at all ( R. 657, 662) and Moreton himself testified that the
price or value of the prope:rty warS not discusse~d in his
second meeting with Plaintiffs in September 1946 ''because
nobody knew. They didn't know. I didn't know" the
value ( R. 669). And Moreton repeatedly tHstified that he
did not know what the value of the prope~rty was in 1946 and
1947 and even up to October, 1948 (R. 601, 603, 652, 656,
666-667' 669).
It is true that at the: trial Moreton did at first attempt
to contradict Rex's testimony that the price was first :fixe;d
in March, 1947 (R. 665 line 27 toR. 666 line- 4), but, when
confronted with his own deposition Moreton broke down and
admitted that the price or value of the M &!i H prop~erty
'Was 1nentioned and discussed for the first time in Ma.rch of
1947 ( R. 666 line 5 to R. 668 line 27).

(d)
Defendants in their brief, of course, cite no authorities
as to how the relationship of Attorney-Client is created.
They merely announce it did not exist in this case. The
general statements of the law from Corpus Juris Secundum
quoted above, make it clear Defendants are wrong. However, since Defendants have raised such a fundamental
question, we list belo\v for the convenience of the Court,
additional authorities showing that, upon such circmnstances as those undisputed on the Record in this case, the
relationship of attorney and client certainly did e·xist; and
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particularly, that it did exist both in July 1947 when Plaintiffs gave Moreton a deed to a 1;4 interest (R. 691, 69·2)
(which even Moreton, upon being confronted with his deposition (R. 701) was forced to admit (R. 702) he had not
earned) and on the critical date, December 20, 1948, when
Plaintiffs sold the rest of their property.
In Keenan v. Scott, Sup. Ct. W.Va., 1908, 61 S. E. 806,
plaintiff claime,d he had employed Scott & Cobb to be his
attorneys in litig~ation involving some land, the title to
which those attorneys acquired in their own name subsequent to the alleged employment.
In reversing a decree for the defendants, the Supreme
Court of West Virginia began by saying it would ''inquire
as to when -did this professional relation commence". It
then quoted from Weeks on Attorneys, Section 183, as follows:
''An attorney may be employed \Yithout formalities
of any kind. The contract 1nay be made by parole
and is often largely i1nplied from the acts of the
parties.''
Following that and the citation of other authorities, the
Court announced (l. c. 809) that:
·'These authorities and n1any others "·hich might be
cited, are conclusi ce of the p1 opos·ition that, as soon
as the client has e.rprcssed a desire to employ wn
attot~ney an,rl thet·e has been a cot·"fespo1tding con.serd
on the part of the attorney to act fot~ hi.Jn in a professional capacity, the -relation of attorney and client
has been established aud that all dealings thereafter
bettveen. the1n relating to the subject of employment
tvill be govet·ned by the rules applicable to such relation.''
4
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In its opinion the Supreme Court of West Virginia cited
the case of Eo If v. Irvine, 108 Mo. 378, 18 S. W. 907, in
·which the Supreme Court of .NiiRsouri, in reversing- the
Court below, held that the Attorney-Client relationship
existed as a matter of law on the basis of the following'
stated facts:
"It appears that the plaintiff and a JYir. Ste~vens (a
retired lawyer) \Vere neighbors * ,x. :r.· plaintiff g-ave
Stevens the abstract of title oX• '~ * but Stevens be~ing
out of the practice, advised plaintiff to employ Blair
& Irvine. The plaintiff did not know these attorneys,
and he requHsted Stevens to take it (the abstract of
title) to them for examination. The evidence of
Stevens is that he left the abstract at the office of
the attorneys on a table but he does not know whether
either of them was present 'YF '" *. In a short time
plaintiff received a note from Irvine (who in the
meantime had, through straws, acquired certain
rights to the property) asking whether he \Vould pay
$1,000 for a quit claim deed, \vith the reque·st to eall.
He says he called at the office of these attorneys and
Irvine pointed out the defects in the title~ and advised
him to procure a deed from the· owne~rs * * *. The
plaintiff paid the attorneys nothing for their services and they made no demand upon him for compensation * * * "
As to such facts, the Supreme Court of Missouri declared:
"This evidence as a whole shows beyond doubt that
Stevens did eJnploy these attorneys arnd that they
examined the abstract pursuant to that employn~ent.
The relation of attorney and client, therefore, diil
exist * 'x: * . ' '
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In Healy v. Gray, Sup. Ct. Io,va 1918, 168 N. W. 2:22, the
plaintiff, 'Yhose father had just died, met the defendant,
an attorney, in the street, and in an informal conversation
asked that the defendant procure plaintiff's appointment
as administrator of his father's estate. Subsequent thereto the defendant's law firm (unbeknownst to plaintiff) acquired title to certain valuable land which, plaintiff claimed,
properly should have been acquired by the estate. D·efendants made the familiar conte·ntion that they thought plaintiff
wanted them to have this land. The Supreme Court of
Iowa said:
''The decision of this case turns upon the question
whether the relation of attorney and client existed
between the parties hereto * * * at the time Appel.lants purchased the land * * * the employment of Appellants by Frank Healy to procure his appointment
as administrator is conceded by ..._~ppellants, but they
seek to limit the scope thereof to that purpose only
* * *
''While the relation of attorney and client rests upon
contract, it is not necessary that any particular formali ties be observed in relation thereto, or that a
retainer be demanded or paid. The contract may be
implie·d from the conduct of the parties * * *.
'' * * * no definite course of procedure 'vas considered or discussed. except . A. ppellant 's claim that
Frank said it "~as all right for them to buy the land.
That the rela.tion of attorney and client existed between Frank Healy as ad Jn in i stra tor a nil Appellants
at the tin1e iu questio,n adnl'ifs of no controversy
* * *

'' * * * Frank Healy believed and understood

tha~

when hP gave the letter to R. C. Gray, the firm was
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acting for hirn in all rnatters pertaining to the estate
of his father. If Appellants desired a more definite
~tnderstanding, or contract, rts to the extent arnd scope
of their er1nploy Jne,nf, they should have so informed
Healy."
This Court has held t.ha~t an Attorney-Client relationship exists whenever one undertakes to draft and prepare
legal documents for another, notwithstanding that the party
drafting the documents is not even a lawyer admitted to
practice at the time. Thus in Malia v. Giles, 100 Utah, 562,
114 P. 2d, 208, 212, this Court said:
"The practice of law includes the preparation of
legal instruments and contracts by which legal
rights are secured. 7 C. J. S. Attorney & Client,
p. 704, Sec. 3g and Note 30. The preparation of the
deed, the note and the n~ortgage ~vas the practice of
lau;. This was done by Mr. Stanley for Mr. Baird
at a time vvhen the former \Yas not admitted to pra.ctice to the Bar of this State. It 'Was the practice of
law nevertheless, and Mr. Stanley tvas Mr. Baird's
attorney in perforn~ing these services. * * * Therefore, his method of attaching and selling the note to
other clients of his O\vn \Vas flying right in the teeth
of his duties to Mr. Baird. It was conduct that public
policy will not tolerate.''

Additionally, this Court, later in the same opinion gave
a complete answer to Defendants' contention (which we discuss in more detail in our next point) that an employment
agreement is any kind of defense to fraud and that a dishonest practitioner can successfuHy, and without liability,
practice fraud on his clients by cunningly arranging and
scheduling the manner, method, timing and sequence of
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the events whereby he is retained and by including the
means of accomplishing his fraud in the very agreement
by which he is employed. Such a thing, this Court announced in no uncertain terms, would never be countenanced, saying:

Mr. Baird's defense based upon this conflict of
interest in Mr. Stanley as an attorney, is well takern..
To permit an attorney to so deal with his clients'
property would countenance a fraud upon the client.
•A< * * That the client may ultimately win the case
makes the transaction none the less reprehensible.
We have already fro\vned upon the conduct of an
attorney 'vhose interests are conflicting. Gillette v.
Newhouse Realty Co., 75 Utah 13, 228 P. 776, 779,
held ' * * * An attorney ntay not by a contract of
employ1nent with his client~ place hin~self in a position where his own interests are in conflict with
those of his client. The relation of an attorney and
client is one of trust and confidence requiring the
attorney to use all care, skill and diligence at his
command to serve his client alone * * * and without
any temptation to serve his own interests at the
expense of his client. The rule th-at an attorney may
not by his contra-ct of employJnenf place lzintSelf in
a position. ·z.vhere h-is ozcu interest or the interests of
another ttvhorn he repTesents cot~tfiict zoi.tll the interests of his client. is founded upon principles of
public policy. It is designed to serfe various purposes, anz.ong then1 to prerent the dishonest practitioner fro1n fraudule·nt co-nduct * * * to further the
orderly a.dn1inistra tion .of justice and to foster respect for the profession and the court * * *. The
attachment in this casl~ is raid as again-st public
policy. ¥:< * ;'{: reversed, and judgJne·nt of no cause of
actio~n entered in fa tor of the Bairds."
u
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See also Lucas v. Smith, Sup. Ct. Cal., 1956, 300 P·. 2d
828, 830.

(e)
Defendants cite no authority for their contention that
the Attorney-Client relationship did not exist in this case
nor do they cite any authority -vvhich in any way excuses
Defendant Moreton's reprehensible conduct. Instead they
cite certain case~s in support of the irrelevant proposition by
which Moreton seeks to e·scape liability for his fraud, nam.ely
that an attorney at the time he accepts an employment
agreement from his client is entitled to drive the be1st bargain he can; and that once the retaine·r agreement is made,
the client cannot therafter upset the agreHment merely
because the other party to it was an attorney.
No one of course disputes the validity of this proposition; however it is not at all applicable to this case. Additionally, as Defendants' own authorities reveal on their face
it has its limits. Thus the statement of the general rule appearing in American Jurisprudence quoted by Defendants
(Dfts. Br. 35) expressly states that while employment contracts between an attorney and client "are not within the
rule of pre·sumption against the attorney,'' they will be upheld and enforced only •' if'' they are ''fair and reasonable'' and do not ''for other reasons contravene public
policy." Of. Malia v. Giles, supra, from which WH have just
quoted and Newhouse v. Gillette, 75 Utah 13, 228 P. 776,
779 cited and quoted therein.
This same limitation appears either expressly or by
clear implication in at least two of the six cases cited by
Defendants under their Point I (which are the only two of
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the six in which an attorney's employment contract was
involved). Thus Swanson v. Hempstead, 149 P. 2d 404
(Dfts. Br. 40) held merely that a 50o/a contingent fee contract was not, as a matter of law, "unconscionab1e;'' and in
Hansel v. Norblad, 151 P. 962 (Dfts. Br. 35), the court, after
pointing out that "no false prete·nce or any act of fraud is
alleged'' state~d only (l.c. 966) that:
* * we are not prepared to say from the testimony that the fee charged for defending a man
for murder in the first degree is so excessive as to
impute fraud to the attorneys.''
'' ,x:

In Lindsay v. Marcus, 325 P. 2d 267 (Dfts. Br. 36) the
defendant (Lindsay, a layman) took prope-rty in his own
name and then repudiated a joint venture agreement for the
acquisition of that property previously entered into between
himself and two others, one o.f whom happened to be an
attorney who had in other matters sometimes performed
leg·al services for Lindsay. No fraud, concealment, misrepresentation, deception or false pretense of any kind
was shown on the part of the attorney. :\Ioreover as the
court itself pointed out ( l.c. 272) the .Attorney-Client
relations~hip was not involved.
In Goodson v. Smith, 243 P. 2d 163 (Dfts. Br. 33) the
attorne~y was not even a party to the contract in dispute.
The contract referred to in the exce~rpt from that case which
Defendants quote (Dfts. Br. 33-34) \Yas not, as Defendants
\vould make it appear, a contract \Vith the attorney at all,
but a contract for the sale of oil a11d mineral rights entered
into between the plaintiff and the principal defendant
in that case, a man named Christy. The attorney's only
connection \\rith thi~ contract \Vas that he had drafted it at
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the insistence of the plaintiff; and as the court pointed out
11 there is no indication whatever that the (attorney) had
any motive for draw·ing any instru·1nents which did not contain the wishes she expressed to him.'' A far cry from the
facts in the Record before this Court.
In re Blodget's Estate, 93 Utah 1, 7 P. 2d 742 (Dfts. Br.
39) is of cours~e no help at all to Moreton; on the contrary,
the very langUJage of this Court which defendants quote
(Dfts. Br. 39-40) is sufficient to convict him. Thus, as this
Court there pointed out, the fiduciary-administrator had a
duty to:
' ' :r:•

,x.

* disclose all estate property and all infor·m.a-

tion to those interested in the estate as to estate
matters, thus ptttting the1n on the same. plane as he
was as to such information regarding all the assets
and transactions.''
But the Record in this case is overwhelming-Hven to
the inclusion of an express and unequivocal confession from
the fiduciary-attorney/agent, himself-that the fiduciary
now before this Court did not disclose all information as to
all transactions and that he did not put the Plaintiffs on an
even plane with himself ( R. 832 lines 2'4-30).
Moore v. Hoar, 81 P. 2d 226 (Dfts. Br. 37) did not even
involve an attorney/client dispute of any kind. In fa.ct on
analysis it involveis only a dispute between two objects
of a dead man's bounty; one, an attorney who was given
an assignment of an interest in some unpatented mining
claims while the man was still living and the othe·r, the
beneficiary under the de:ad man's will.
No false pretense or concealment or fraud of any kind
were, it appears, even charged to have been committed by
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the attorney. Instead, it was only charged (in order to get
the benefit of the presumption of invalidity of contracts
between attorneys and their clients) that an Attorney-Client
relationship existed at the time of the assignment. However, it was found as a fact at the trial (conducted without
a jury) that the relationship of attorney and client did not
exist at such time and the California District Court o.f Appe~als (while describing the testimony as to the absence of
any Attorney-Client relationship as ''far from satisfactory") said that, neverthless it "must be conceded" that
the Trier of the Fact (who had had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and appearance of the witnesses on the
stand), "was entitled'' to make such a finding and (I.e.
237):
"It may not, therefore, be declared, as appellants
contend, that the finding negativing the existence of
the fiduciary relationship on the date mentioned is
so lacking in evidentiary support that it must be set
aside.''
Thus, on analysis the decision in Moore v. Hoar, which
Defendants cite is really authority for Plaintiffs' proposition (urged in our next Point II), that the existence or

non-existence of an Attorney-Client relationship .Zs a question of fact and is, therefore, for the determi-nation of a
jury when one is demanded as ,it was in the carSe at bar.
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II.
Replying to Defendants' Conte·ntion That the
Existence of the Confidential Relationship
Was a Matter f·or the Court and Not the Jury
(Dfts. Br. Point I)

(a)
D.efendants state on page 34 of their brief that "the
authorities are abundant without dissent that it is the duty
of the court to determine as a legal matter the question
of the interpretation of the instruments before it''. Preceding that they state on pages 27 and 28 that ''if any
such relationship of attorney and client vvas created, it
·would necessarily have to arise from the interpretation
and construction of the option, which we submit is impossible' '. 7
The ''option'' they are talking about is, of course, the
''lost" option of April 6, 1946 and we agree with them
that it was "impossible" for the trial court to have inte,rpreted that option. It was rendered "imposstble-" because
the Defendant Moreton who drew the option and was the
7

In this connection D·efendants burden their Brief with what appears to be another misstatement. Thus on page 28 they state "We
agree with plaintiff's Point I to the effect that the relationship between
the parties was a matter of law for the Court to detennine." This
of course represents a completely erroneous description of Plaintiffs'
position. Point I of Plaintiffs' Brief recognizes that tfue existence
of the confidential relationship is a matter of fact to be determined
by the jury; but, we pointed out that, on the Record in this case, the
evidence ·establishing the existence of the fiduciary relationship was so
undisputed and one-sided, that the Court could properly have taken
the issue ·away from the jury and decided it as a matter of law.
(Pl. Br. 20-24)
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only person who ever had a copy of that option, failed to

produce it at any time during the course of this litigation
either during his deposition or any of the other depositions
or at the trial (R. 622) and, further, failed to give any explanation as to how or why this document, of all docurnents
involved, happens to be the one he did not produce.

Obviously a defendant's supp-ression of documentary
eviden·ce can never be the basis for escaping liability which
the documents, had they been produced, would impose. In
fact, there is a presumption operating against a party,
known to have had evidence in its possession bearing upon
an issue, which such party without any plausible explanation (in fact in this case without any explanation at all)
fails to produce. The presumption is that the evidence if
produced would have been unfavorable to the contention of
such party. Thus on this state of the Record, Moreton's
failure to produce the ''lost'' option agreement of the
spring of 1946 brings into play against Moreton the presumption that had this "lost" option been produced it
would have established the existence of the Attorney-Client
relationship as of the date it bore, ''Thich date Moreton
himself has fixed as being April 6, 1946. In such a situation
it cannot be maintained as Defendant contends that the
trial court had any basis for directing a verdict for the
Defendant Moreton because the Attorney--Client relationship had not been established.
Moreover even giving Defendant l\loreton the benefit of
every doubt, even assuming that his failure to produce the
''lost'' option '"as excusable and that the presumption
should not be employed against hi1n, the Trial Court was
still not justified ~in directing a ve'rdict on the ba.sis of this
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issue because it is the unani1nous holding of all courts that
whenever the creation, existence, contin;uation, repudiation,
terrnination or abandonment of a confidential relationship,
including the relationship of Attorney-C'lient, is in dispute
it is a question of fact to be determined by a jury whenever,
as in this case, a trial by jury has been de:manded.

(b)
For the convenience of the Court we have collected
below some cases which illustrate the unanimity of all
courts on this point.
In Pettine v. A.rster, 136 Atl. 8: the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island stated :
''Plaintiff testified that defendant aske:d him to try
the case. Defendant denied this statement * .x· ..:· this
conflicting testimony required submission of the
issue to the jury."
In Bonelli v. Conrad, 1 C. A. 2nd 660, 37 P. 2d 137, 141,
the California District Court of Appeals held:
''The court did not err in refusing to instruct the
jury that the undisputed evidence showed that the
contract in question was enteTed into while the relationship of attorney and client existed. This was a
question of fact in issue before the jury, and the
court properly refrained from invading its peculia.r
province.''
In this case Rex Holland's testimony as to the conversation between Plaintiffs and Moreton in the spring of 19'46,
·when they accepted Moreton's offer to act as their attorney, was, as previously indicated, undenied by Defendant
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Moreton. Thus this is a much stronger case on its facts
than Graeser v. Jones, 2!51 N. W. 16·2, in which, as to the
Attorney-Client employnH~nt contract, the Supreme Court
of Iowa stated:
''Appellant predicates error on the action of the
trial court in submitting the case to the· jury, claiming that there was not sufficient evidence that a contract was entered into, as alleged, to warrant the
submission of the question to the jury. Plaintiff
testified to the conuersation with Jones, in which it
is claimed the agreentent was made. He testified to
every fact necessary to create a contract. The defendant denied essential1Jortion-s of the conversation
as related by plaintiff·. This conflict in the testimony
did not destroy plaintiff's testi-rnony. It was a question for the jury to say zDhether they ~vould believe
plaintiff or defen-dant. It follows that the court
properly submitted the court to the jury."
In Kreatz v. J.VlcDonald, 143 N. \V. 975, 976, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota similarly held that:
Whether or not plaiu.tifj' enzployed defendant to
foreclose the lien teas_, no doubt, a question for the

u

jury.''
It has been held error for a court to direct a verdict
on the waiver or abando1nnent of an alleged relationship
of Attorney-Client. Thus the Supreme Court of West Virginia in Buckhann-on Bauk v. 0 'Brien d: Hall. 180 S. E. 258,
260, reversed the trial court for directing a verdict in such
a situation saying:
''So, as \Ve ~ee it. the eorrectness of the court's
action depends on \Y1IPther there "~as sufficient evi-
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deuce of a \Vaiver or abandonment of the alleged
relationship between the Bank and defendants to
have gone to the jury * ,x. *.
We are of the opinion that under the circun1stances
the case should have been permitted to go to the
jury tmder proper instructions.''
Similarly, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Jinks v.
Moppin., 80 S. vV. 390, 3.9'3, held it was error to take the issue
of continuance of the confidential relationship of AttorneyClient a-\vay from the jury so long as there was some evidence showing its continuance. The court stated:
"If it can be said that some evidence was adduced
tending to show the continuance of the rela.tion, the
question should have been left to the ju,ry."

To like effect is the holding of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina in Francis v. Mortgage Security Corp. of
.America, 153 S. E. 317, 318, where the court said:
''There wa.s a direct conflict in the evidence as to
whether the plaintiff "\Vas employed >r.: * * and the
issue necessarily called for a determination of this
question. Hence it was error to direct a verdict
thereon.''
Even the question of whether a certain writing' should
be regarded as an attorney's employment contract has been
held to be one for the jury. Thus the Supreme Court of
Kansas in Austin v. Prudential Trust Company, 112 Kan.
545, 212 P. 77, 80, said :

" * * * The question of whether it (the writing)
should be * * * regarded as an employment of the
. plaintiff by the trustee to prose·cute such action as
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his attorney \vas one to be determined by the triers
of fact.''
In Gillis v. Paddocks Estate, 109 N. W. 734, the Trial
C'ourt at the close of the trial directed a verdict for the
defendant. The Supreme Court of Nebraska after pointing out that there was conflicting testimony reversed, sayIng:
" ,x. * * Under that set of facts the case should have
been submitted to the jury, with proper instructions,
to determine when the contract of eniployment was
in fact made * * *. ''
T'he Supreme Court of Oreg·on has held it is not' error
for a trial court to overrule defendant's motion for a
non-suit and refuse to direct a verdict in favor of the defendants as to the issue of the existence or non-existence
of an attorney-client relationship. S.o long· as there was
some evidence tending to support the claim of one of the
parties on this point, the sufficiency of that evidence, the
court pointed out, was a matter to be determined by the
jury and not by the judge at the trial. Thus in Currey v.
Butcher, 37 Ore. 61 P. 631, 634, the court stated:
''This motion \YaB based upon the contention that
there was no proof that the defendants were actually employed by the plaintiff to examine the title
to the land referred to, or that the relation of attorney and client existed bet\Yee-n then1. It is sufficient
to say that an Pxan1ination of the record discloses
that there leas son1c eridence tendi,ng to supp-ort the
J>la,intiff's tlain1 upon this point. Its snfficiency was
for the .fury, and uot the court.,''
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III.

Replying to Defendants' Contentions That the
Parties Were Engaged in a Mining P'artnership and That as a Co-Tenant Moreton Had No
Duty to Disclose (Dfts. Br. Point II)
(a)
Upon the citation and quotation of excerpts from authorities on l\'Iining Law, and cases involving mining partnerships, Defendants se:ek to create the erroneous impression that Plaintiffs and Moreton either were engaged in a
mining partnership or that their only relation with each
other was that of co-tenants (Dfts. Br. 43-47).
This co-tenancy came about, D,efendants misleadingly
relate, when Plaintiff's ''sought Mr. Moreton out as· a
prospective purchaser for the claims" (Dfts. Br. 42) and
upon this ''ground alone'', they erroneously contend, the
trial court would have been justified in granting the judgme'llt notwithstanding the verdict (Dfts. Br. 42).
The Record, of course, does not bear out Defendants'
version that Plaintiffs sought out Moreton, although Moreton tried hard to make it appear that way at the trial. Thus
Moreton testified that on the original meeting in the Spring
of 1946, Plaintiffs "came to me" (R. 609). But he was
almost immediately forced to concede that neither Rex
Holland nor his father John ever said anything to indicate
that they had sent for MoTeton to come down to Cedar
City (R. 610), and furthe~r admitted that the night before
he ever saw the Plaintiffs, he (Moreton) together with
Murie-whom ~1oreton was paying at least up to the time
of the trial (R. 448)-had actually g·one out and examined
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theM & H properties (R. 633, 799-800). Likewise More~ton's
attempt to explain the open map he had laid out showing
the JYI & H properties when Plaintiffs first walked into his
(Moreton's) hotel room (R. 332-333), on the ground that "I
brought it :r.c * * (the map) in connection with my own
claim~s" (R. 610-611) is contradicted by the fact that Moreton's own claims were, as he himself said, ''about twelve
miles west, clear across the desert and on the other side
of the mountain'' from the ~I & H claims (R. 5,S7).
And, finally Moreton's testimony that on September 1,
1946 he stopped at the El Escalante Hotel and stayed ''there
that night and probably the next two or three" (R. 801),
on business ''in connection with my own properties'' was
completely punctured by testimony from Mr. Fred Warner,
Manager of the El Escalante Hotel, that the records of the
hotel do not show that Moreton stayed there overnight on
any night during the period August 24 to September 5, 1946
(R. 843). So that, it would appear Moreton came down to
Cedar City on September 1, 1946 for the sole purpose of
seeing Plaintiffs and procuring their signatures to the
second option (P. Ex. 4), dated September 1, 1946, and
then left for Salt Lake immediately thereafter on the same
day that he eame down. 8
The records of the El Escalante Hotel also contraclict Moreton-'s
to Cedar City in the Spring of 1946.
Moreton denied that he went do\vn to Cedar City on that trip with
his wife; he said "I am sure I did not" (R. 800) but P. Ex. 59, one
of the registration cards \Vhich l\Ioreton signed ·when he registered
at the hotel in the Spring of 1946 . sho\YS that he tnust have brought
his wife with hitn because she was registered as sharing ~Ioreton's
roon1 for the length of his stay (R. 841-843) \vhich began at 6:15 p.
n1. on the evening of April 2 . 1946 (R. 843).
8

test·in~ony as to his first visit
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(b)
Thus Defendants' picture of 11:oreton as an innocent
purchaser whom Plaintiffs badge1·ed every time he cam.e
to Cedar City until they finally importuned him either to
enter a mining partnership or become a co-tenant with them,
is not at all supported by the evidence and testimony in
the case. Additionally, even if true, it is no defense, as
even Defendants' own authorities reveal.
In their attempt to create the impression that there was
a mining partnership betvveen the parties in this case, Defendants cite Harris v. Lloyd, 28 P. 736 (Dfts. Br. 43, 44).
They also cite one of the cases relied on and quoted in
Harris v. Lloyd-the case of Bissell v. F'oss, 114 U. S. 25·2,
5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 851, 2.9· L:. Ed. 12~6. But, neither of these
cases has any pertinence to the case at bar for any purpose other than to establish that whatever relationship the
parties had, it was certainly not a mining partnership.
In Harris v. Lloyd, certain property on whtich mining
operations had previously been carried on, was sold, and
one of the tenants in common owning that property, Lloyd,
got $30,000 more than his co-tenants. For some years prior
to the sale Lloyd and his co-tenants had also been parties
to a mining partnership in the operation and exploitation
of the mine but that partnership had been terminated and
all mining operations pursuant to it had ceased at least
two weeks before the sale. Following a trial, the jury had
brought in a special verdict, finding that Lloyd had not
"in any manner whatever" induced the co-tenants to sell
their interest, and further, that Lloyd had not'' at any time
or at all'' 1nade any false statements whereby his co-tenants
were induced to sign the contract of sale.
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The trial judge, who was apparently unaware of the
difference between a mining partnership and an ordinary
commercial partnership, held that Lloyd actually stood in
a partnership relation with his co-tenants at the time of the
sale, and that notwithstanding the jury's verdict that he
did not induce the sale and that he 1nade no false statements
''at any tim.e or at all'' to induce the sale, he \Vas, nevertheless, as a partner, liable because of his failure to disclose to the others that he was g·etting· $30,000 more than
they were.
The Supreme Court of Montana reversed, noting that
there was no basis for any finding by the trial court of any
kind of fraud on the part of Lloyd in vie\v of the jury's
finding to the contrary. It pointed out that the only partnel}ship relation between the parties had been a mining partnership relation and cited Bissell v. Foss for the proposition that members to a mining partnership do not have the
same duties as regards the sale or transfer of their interest
in the partnership that members of an ordinary commercial partnership have. It held that upon the termination
of the mining partnership, the only relation between the
parties was one of co-tenancy, and that under that relation
Lloyd had no duty to disclose \Vhat he \Vas getting for the
sale of his interest and that thus, the mere fact that he
did not disclose to them tl1a t he \ras getting the extra
$30,000 \vas not. sufficient to render hun liable to them for it,
citing for that proposit,ion thl") leadil1g case of llfatthews v.
Bliss, 2::2, Pick. 48-\Y hich, as \Ye \Yill sho'v belo\Y, conclu:-~ively establishes ~Iorc~ton 's liability on the R.ecord in this
case.
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A mere reading of Harris v. Lloyd is sufficient to establish that Defendants' suggestion that a mining partnHrship
existed between Plaintiffs and 1\!lort•ton merits no consideration. In distinguishing between mining partnerships and
other partnerships, the court in Harris v. Lloyd cited and
quoted not only from Bissell v. Foss, but also from the
opinion of Mr. Justice Field in the later case of Kimberly
A.rrns, 129 U. S. 512, 32 L. Ed. 764 which delineates
the line between a mining partnership and an ordinary
partnership and shows conclusively why there was no
mining partnership in the case before this Court. Mr.
Justice Field said (1. c. 770-771) :
''The case of Bissell Y. Foss, 114 U. S. 252, 5 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 851, does not seem to us to have any bearing on the subject under consideration. There the
question was whether a member of a mining partnershitJ-that is, a partnership for·1ned for the developrnent and working of a n~ine-could acquire the
shares of an associate without the knowledge of the
other associates and hold them on his own account,
and the court held it vvas lavvful for him to do so. * * *
The partnership between Arrns and Kin~berly was
not a mining partnership, in the prope~r sense of
that term. It was not a partnership for de:veloping
and working mines, but for tlle purchase and sale of
minerals and 1nining lands, and in that respect was
subject to the rules governing ordinary trading or
commercial partnerships. It can no more be called a
·mining partnership than a partner·ship for the purchase of the products of a farm and the lands upon
which those products are raised can be called a pa.rtnership to farm~ lands."
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(c)
As. previously indicated, even if Defendants' erroneous
contention that the only relation hetwe·en the· parties was
one of co-tenancy, be, for the sake of argument, as,sumed,
the error of the trial court must still be reversed, for on
the undisputed Record in this case, and under the authority
of Matthews v. Bliss, supra (cited, quoted and heavily relied
upon in Harris v. Lloyd on which Defendants principally
rely), Moreton's liability app·ears as a matter of law.
In Mat thews v. Bliss, one of several co-owners of a ship
sued the others, alle·ging that they had conspired to get him
to sell his inte>re·st in the ship for a price lower than that
which they had already arranged to receive for theh"s. The
trial court directed a verdict for the defendants on the
ground that since the only relationship of the parties was
as co-owners of a ship, the defendants had no duty to disclose the higher price defendants vvere getting for their
inte-rest in the ship. The Supreme Court of ~Iassachusetts,
while conceding that this was a correct statement of the-law,
neverthele·ss reversed, because as its opinion reveals, cotenants, while they have no duty to disclose, have other
duties which if breached, rend~r them liable. The Court
said:
' ' »:, * :y,, The Court are of the opinion, that the tenants
in common of a vessel "'"ho are not engaged jointly
in the employment of purchasing or building ships
for sale, do not stand in such a relation of mutual
trust and confidence to\vards each other, in respect
of the sale of such vessel, that each is bound in his
dealings "Tith the other, to con1munica.te all the inforInation of fact ,\·ithiu his kno,vledge ,\·hich may effect
the price or value. * * * but, al-iud est tacere, aUu,d
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celare. With this advantageous kno~wledge, if there
be studied efforts to prevent the other party coming
to the knowledge of the tru.th or if there be any,
though slight, false and fraud.ule:n.t suggestion or
representation, tlz en tll e transaction is tainted with
turpitu.de, and alike contrary to the rules of morality
and law.''

Thus, the establishment of either of two elHments (preventing the other parties from le~arning the. truth and any
false or fraudulent suggestion, however "slight")-both of
which are undisputed in the record of this case-would be
sufficient under Matthews v. Bliss to render "the transaction * * tainted with turpitude, and alike contrary t;o
the rules of morality and law."
Moreton himself admitted he prevented the plaintiff
from ''coming to the knowledge of the truth'' when he sent
back the single document embodying the Contract of Sale
which Columbia, according to its usual practice ( R. 549)
had drafted (R. 551, 770-771) and insisted that two separate
documents he employed-one covering the sale of his onequarter intere·st and the othe-r covering the1 sale of his
client's thre·e-quarter intere.st in theM & H claims (R. 771).
Had the single contract been employed, Plaintiffs would
of course have learned the truth as. to the ''false and fraudulent suggestion or repre.sentation'' which Moreton made t:o
them at his meeting with them in Cedar City on March 10,
1947 when, according to Rex Holland (R. 343 to 344):
=K•

''A. And the price at that time was mentioned.
'' Q. Tell us what was said a:bout that subject.
A. That price can1e from Mr. Moreton, that because
of the depth of the ore body, because~ of the vast
amounts of money that would have to he spent to
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move the overburden over that ore to open pit mine
that, that we could not expect to get more than ten
cents a ton for the ore that was in that ore body."
And-" A. It come from 1fr. 1\Ioreton, that he
thought that we could get $133,000 as an overall
price for the property. Out of this $133,000 we were
to get $100,000 and that vv-ould leave him $33,000,
vvhich would be equal to our individual one-fourth
interest.''
Had Moreton not prevented the employment of the original single document, Plaintiffs would have also learned
of Moreton's further misrepresentations in July of 1947
when the Agreement of Ownership was signed (R. 359-365) 9
S<et forth in Rex' testimony as follows (R. 365) :
''The Court: All right. -nT as anything else said,
Mr. Holland~
''The Witness: There \\Tas something said in
there about'' ~fr. Gustin: In ''T-here~ X O"\v, just a minute.
''The vVitness: X ot in this, no.
''The Court: In this conversation.
''The Witness : In this conversation about the
thought of 1,550,000 tons at 10 cents a ton would
not exceed $150,000.''

Note: This testimony was never denied. Moreton, in
all the days he was on the stand, never denied making these
misrepresentations in March and July, 1947. As a matter
of fact, Moreton's own testimony substantiates and confirms Rex' testimony. ~I ore ton repeatedly in his testimony
As the above record reference indicates, Defendants' statement
( Dfts. Br. 31) that the record shows no tnisrepresentation when the
.Agreetnent of Ownership was signed-is sitnply not true.
9
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stated that nobody knew ''what price peT ton could be obtained'' because the size of the overbn rden and whether or
not the ore could he mined by open pit method were- critical
factors in determining that price ( R. 600, 601, 603, 604, 645,
669, 676, 784, 829, 830). ~loreton even admitted (after being
confronted, of course, with his deposition) that he had
actually quoted the Plaintiffs a price of '' 121;2¢ for underground ore" (R. 831-832).

IV.
Replying to Defendants' Co·ntentions as to
the Statute of Limitations (Dfts. Br. Pts.

IV, V & VI)
(a)
Defendants attempt to justify the e-rror of the trial
court on the ground that the- action was barred by the
St·atute of Limitations and, in that connection, they announce that ''the time of discovery is a matter of law for
the Court to determine'' ( Dfts. Br. 79).
They cite no cases for this proposition and there are
none: the law is entirely to the contrary. Thus in 54 C. J. S.
Limi·tation of Actions Sec. 400 p. 5·52 it is said that:
"Ordinarily where fraud, mistake, concealment or a
trust relationship is relied on to take the case out
of the operation of the statute of limitations, the. matters to be determined by the jury or trier of fact as
questions of fact include the existence of the fraud or
concealment or of the trust relationship, the: time
when plaintiff first discovered the frau.d, or received
notice of the repudiation of the trust, and whether· by
the exercise of due diligence he could have discovered
at an earlier date, that he had a cause of action; and
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these matters will n.ot be decided by the court as questions of la,w."

Numerous pronouncements of the courts are in accord;
thus:
Stevens v. Marco (Cal.), 305 P. 2nd 669, 684:

''From the evidence we cannot hold as a matter of
law that any of the circumstances known to plaintiff should have put a reasonably prudent peTson on
inquiry. This is usually a question of fact. * * *
it u;as a question for the jury to determine whether
plaintiff's delay tv as reaso!flrable or excusable. It is
not a question zve can decide as a matter of law O'nj
these facts."
Easton v. Chaffe (Sup. Ct. Wash. 1941), 113 P. 2nd

31, 34:
''Respondent argues that Appellant had knowledge
of all the facts upon ''Thich he bases his cause of
action more than three years before the complaint
was filed. \:V-.- e think, however, that appellant's evidence supported all the material allegations * * *
and u;as therefore sufficient to take the case to the
jury. In reaching this conclusion, ' "·e ha Ye not overlooked respondent's contention that the court rejected certain letters offered by respondent for the
purpose of proY"ing appellar1t 's knowledge of the
facts more than three years before the action was
brought. Assu'nliug the letters 1oere adn1,.iss·ible and
that the.lJ hard been ad Jnitted. fll-e issue would have
still been for the j:trry. '·
Linebaugh v. Portland Jiortgage Co. (Sup. Ct. Ore.
1925), 116 Ore. 1, 239 P. 296, 199:
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''"\Vhen the alleged fraud was discovered, or whether
reasonable dilig·ence \vas exercised by plaintiffs to
discover same are ordinary questions of fact for the
jury. 37 C. ,J. 1255. : ;: ' :• =:·:· In the consi-deration of
this question zDe are not 'llen.mindful of the constitutional provision (Article 7, Sec. 3) ·which precludes
'US fro?n invading the province of the jury, and will
therefore not be concerned with 1natters u.pon which
the evidence is conflicting.''
Birmingham Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Lovell, 5th Cir.,
1936, 81 Fed. 2nd 5HO, 593 :

''Suit was filed within one year after the date upon
vvhich Lovell testified he had discovered the fraud.
Under the provisions of th~ *;, * *'' Alabama Code,
the statute did not begin to run until the fraud was
discovered. It tvas clearly the province of the jury
to resolve the conflict in the evidence and to deter?nine 'Whether, on all the evidence the statute of limitations created a bar to the sui.t. ''
Schillner v. H. Vaughan, 2nd Cir., 1943, 134 Fed. 2nd
875, 878-879:

''The appellants contended that in the exercise of
reasonable diligence the discovery should have been
made before July 25, 1938 and so the action was
barred * * * the issue of reasonable diligence wa.s
properly submitted to the jury. Its verdict is con,..
clusive."
(b)
Defendants further argue on the 1ssue of Limitations
that Plaintiffs were charged with knowledge of what \Vas
contained in the recorded deed. They ignore and make no
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effort to distinguish the cases cited in our original brief to
the effect that the recording· acts will not be employed to
aid in the accomplishment of a fraud (Pl. Br. 55) and that
the constructive notice rule does not apply where the
existence of a fiduciary or confiden tia). r:ela.tionship is
shown (Pl. Br. 56).
They themselves cite 110 cases involving a fiduciary relationship; moreover such cases as they do cite either support
Plaintiffs' position or are distinguishable for an additional
reason over and above those given in our original brief
(Pl. Br. 55-57) ; this appears from the following in 54
C. J. S. Limitation of Actions, Sec. 189b, p. 194:
''The record of a conveyance is notice only to those
'vho are bound to search for it, and in this behalf
it has been said that the record of a deed or other
instrument is constructiYe notice only to those acquiring the interests subsequent to the e·xecution
thereof; and the recording of a deed 'vhich fraudulently included more land than ''as intffilded to be
conveyed is not notice to the grantor of a fraud
* * ."
:)(<:

In Davis v. ll!I on roe, 41 Atl. 444, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in reversing a judgment for plaintiffs said:
''But as to any land not intended to be granted, and
only included in the deed through fraud, defendant
continued to hold his former title and the Statute of
Lin1itations did not run ng-ain8t hin1 lUltil discovery~
or such notice as to put him on inquiry. The learned
Judge \Vas of the opinion that the recording of the
deed \Yas constructiYe notice to appellant of the extant of Cobb '8 clai1n under it, and that after twenty-
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one years, appellant could not be held to dispute his
grant. In this he gave too broad an effect to the
notice employed by the reeordiug acts. The record
is only notice to those ~oho are bound to search for it,
including parties subsequently dealing with the land,
or concerned vvith its title •:.< 'x< ~: but, in general, antecedent rights are not affected. The re:cording of a
deed is the act of the grantee, and in his interest.
He may or rr&ay not put it on ~record for yea.rs or at
all. The grantor is under no obligation to see to its
recording or to examine the tern~s thereof. Conseque;ntly it is no notice to him.''
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Stocklassa v. Kinnamon, 269 Pac. 1080, 1081-1082, S·aid:

* '~ It is next contended that the recording of
the deed constituted constructive notice such as to
set the Statute of Limitations in motion * * *. In
the case of Webb, et al. v. Logan, e.t a.Z., 48 Okla. 354;
150 Pac. 2d, 116 :r.: * * the Court said: 'To hold tha.t
the recording of deeds of this character would he
constructive notice to the grantor and sta.rt the
Statute of Limitations would work a great injustice
in this state, and to our minds, would put a premium
on dishonesty and rascality. •X< *
The doctrine
announced in this case, \Ve think is sound, and should,
at least in principle, control this que·stion in the
instant case. No duty rests upon the grantor to
examine the records with reference to the title~ of
the land after it vvas purchased and hence the public
record thereof is not such constructive notice as will
set the Statute of Limitations in motion.''
" ·x:

>'/.<

;'

','

'

In Wagner v. Wagner, 38 N. W. 2d 609, 610, the Supreme
~. Court of Iowa said:

I.·
1
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''It appears they (certain instruments) were filed
for record in 1936. The question here is whether
this gave plaintiffs constructive notice of the contents of the instruments so as to start the running
of the Statute of Limiations at that time. We hold
it did not. * * * It is not the purpose of the recording
act to charge the parties with constructive notice of
the precise contents of the instruments they execute
but to notify subsequent purchasers and encum.brancers of the rights such instruments are intended
to secure. Therefore it cannot be said that the action
was not commenced within the time limit of the
Statute.''
(c)
Defendants' authorities do not contradict the foregoing;
in fact those that ~are at all relevant to the issue suppo.rt
Plaintiffs' position. For instance, Smith v. Edwards, 81
Utah 244, 17 P. 2d 264 (Dfts. Br. 64, 65, 66, 68), on which
Defendants so heavily rely, plainly establishes only that
this Court (in accord with other courts) does not view that
the reco~ding of deeds is, of itself, sufficient notice to set
the Statute of Limitations in motion where fraud is charged.
In that case defendants' creditors moved to set aside as
fraudulent defendants' conveyance of certan1 tracts to his
sons. The conveyances had been made and duly recorded
on or before the end of 1920, but the action was not commenced until1927. Thus if nz.ere recording zoa-s sufficient to
start the statute~ the actio·n 'ltas clearly bart"ed and no discussion of any other evidence Leas necessary on the issue
of limitations. Since, on those facts this Court, neverthe'"
less did discuss the evidence it is plain that 1nere recording
was not deemed to be enough. And an~~ question as to this
is resolved by the citation in Bn~ith Y. Edwa'rds of Chinn v.
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Curtis, 71 S. W. 923; Duxbury v. Boice, 70 Minn. 113; 72
N. W. 838.
In Chinn v. Curtis, the Sup1·0me Court of Kentucky
(affirming a ruling below that the action was not ba;rred by
limitations) said (1. c. 924):

'' * * * the recording * * * throws little light on
the question of discovery. It is ad1nissible evidence
on that question; and when the manner of its execution and registration, and other facts and circumstances in the case, would be sufficient to put a
person on Inquiry, the law declares this to be
notice. * * * "

And in the Duxbury case (which Defendants also cite
on page 66 of their brief) the Supreme Court of Minnesota
said (1 c. 839):
'' * * * the question is what constitutes a 'discovery' within the meaning of the statute~ Mere
constructive notice of the deed by reason of its being
filed for record, is not notice of the facts constituting
the fraud. ''

Neither S,Jnith v. Edwards nor Chinn v. Curtis nor Duxbury v. Boice involve a fiduciary relation. Nor did Taylor
v. Moore, 51 Pac. 2d 222 (Dfts. Br. 59), which further did
not even involve a statute of limitation defe·nse but was
only an action for rescission in which this Court expressly
said that while plaintiffs may have waived the .right to
rescind ''they must be left to every remedy at law for
damages." No fiduciary relation was involved in Gibson v.
Jensen, 15 Pac. 426 (Dfts. Br. 59, 84). Moreover, "the evidence of fraud" there was not" strong'', and it was' 'undis-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

42

puted that plaintiff was fully advised of the fraud practised
upon her * * * in a letter from Mr. Healey to her in which
he made a full statement respecting his faults in the transaction.'' Such a decision of course is no help to Moreton
who confessed at the trial that he never disclosed ''his
faults in the transaction" (R. 832). Similarly in LeVine v.
Whitehouse, 109 Pac. 2d (Dfts. Br. 80), there was no fiduciary relation and the plaintiff himself testified (l. c. 6) that
he discovered the fraud within a month after it was practis:ed.
And in Ferrell v. Wiswell, 143 Pa.c. 582 (Dfts. Br. 60)
not only was there no fiduciary relation but according to
the statement of the court the evidence was overwhelming
that ''there was no deceit, fraud or misrepresentation of
any kind practised upon the appellant''. The trial court
did not make and on the Record could not have made any
such statement in this case.
Nor is Bonded Adjustment Co-1npany v. Anderson, 57
Pac. 2d 1046 ( Dfts. Br. 63) any help to Defendants. Ratification, the critical issue in that case (which like the re:st of
Defe·ndants' cases involved no confidential relation), is not
supported in any way by the Record in this case. .Additionally, the Bonded Adjustnlent Conzpany case is completely inapplicable to this case by reason of the limitation
of its holding which apperu~s on the face of the decision in
St. John v. Hendrickson (a case also involving no confidential relation) cited, quoted and relied on both by the court
in Bonded Adjustnle·Jd con1pa·ny and by Defendants here.
In St. J oh~n v. H e·ndri.ckso·n. 81 Ind. 350 (Dfts. Br. 63), the
court first said :
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''We fully recognize and a.pprove the rule that a
party may retain whatever he receives, stand to his
bargain and recover for the loss caused him by the
fraud. vV e do not 'menn to run counter to this rule.
We neither hold nor mean to hold that affirmation by
retention of the thing bargained for· cuts oIf an action
for dama.ges."

Having thus circumscribed its position, what follows
must be read as a holding only :
''that where a party, 'vith full knowledge of all the
material facts does an act which indicates his intention to stand to the contract and waive a.Zl right of
action for f'raud, he cannot maintain an action for the
original wrong practised upon him.''
It is undisputed on this record that as soon as Plaintiffs
·secured" full knowledge of all material facts" the,y plainly
and unmistakably manifested an intention to ·sue (R. 400. 402, 449-452). Nothing in the re,cord even remotely sug,gests that they had any intention after they acquired ''full
·knowledge" to ''waive all right of action fo~ fraud''. See,
for instance, Ex. P -68 and Ex. P -69 ( R. 909-911).
Preston v. Shields, 156 Pac. 2d 543 (Dfts. Br. 63), involved no fiduciary relation and no fraud. The de·cision in
that action to quiet title turned on the fact that the plaintiff
had sat by and permitted defendant to s.eriously change
its position and spend large sums of money over a period
of years in discovering oil on the propHrt~ies. But Moreton
"'lever spent one penny to develop the M & H properties.
·.'· 1\foreover, there is nothing in the Reeord indicating any
serious change of position on his part or any prejudice to
him resulting from the fact that Pl~aintiffs did not sooner
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discove-r his fraud. If anything, the delay in commencing·
the action has been a benefit to him in that he has had the
use of the fruits of his fraud during a period of unparalleled national prosperity -vvhich offered countless oppor~
tunities for investment and profit to any one possessed of
such a tremendous sum.
Neither is Cherington v. Woods, 290 Pac. 2d 266 (Dfts.
Br. 70) at all relevant to any issue in this case. It involveld
no confidential re~lationship and no fraud. There the purchase~r of a liquor store had under his contract of purchase
the express right to examine the books and re-cords of the
store in order to ascertain the truth of sellers' representation as to the profitability of the store·; since the buyer
did not avail himself of this right, the court held that he
was in no position to complain; the court pointed out
"there is absolutely no fraud in the record". .And Froelich
v. United Royalty Co., 291 P. 2d 93 (Dfts. Br. 65)-involving like all the others no confidential relationship-merely
announces the rule (inapplicable to this case) that recorded
instruments constitute notice to subseque1~t purchasers.

v.
Replying to D·efendants' Contention That Plaintiffs
Had Actual Knowledge of the Price (Dfts. Br. Points

III, IV and V)
Defendants' attempt to make something of the fact thaJt
the price of 25¢ per ton was refe·rred to in Rex' letter to
Dr. Ma.thesius (P. Ex. 14). This they say proves that
Rex kue\v that the price Coltu11bia paid for the ~I & H
properties "\\ras 25·¢ a. ton. Ori the record it is clear and
undisputed even fron1 the· testimony of defe·ndant ]foreton
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himself that it proves no such thing. As Moreton re.pea~tedly
stated, 25·¢ a ton was the highest price Columbia was known
to have ever paid for ore in the State of Utah (R. 602, 603,
604, 765, 828-832). But, Moreton also said, again and again,
· that was no indication of what price Columbia would actually pay for ore in the M & H claim or any other specific
claim because the actual price to be paid for any specific
claim, including Plaintiffs' M & H claim, would ·depend on
:many things ( R. 601-605) including the depth of the ore body
and whether or not the ore could be readily mined by open
pit methods (R. 645,, 669, 676, 784, 830, 832). Thus, according to Moreton, himself, while Rex and everyone else in
Iron County might have known that 25¢ was the hig~hes~t
~price Columbia had eveT paid for ore in that area, neitheT
:·Rex nor Moreton nor anyone had any way of knowing from
i: that fact whether or not Plaintiffs would get that highes~t
price for the ore in their M & H claims ( R. 601, 603, 604, 645,
.656, 666-668, 669, 828-832,). Therefore any knowledge- of
Rex as to the theoretical 25·¢ maximum price per ton cannot
be said to have been knowledge of the price pe~r ton that
Columbia was going to pay or did pay for the ore· in the
M & H claims. And this is made clear by Moreton's own
testimony (R. 601-605, 656, 669) and e~specially that immedi"ately preceding and leading up to his final confession (R.
828, line 18 to R. 832, line 29').

It is impossible to ·see how anyone on the Record in this
ease could give .serious conside1ration to Mof'eton's testi~mony. First of all he was telling a highly improbable
>Story. It will be remembe,red that according to Moreton
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there was "bargaining" at the original n1eeting between
him·self and the Plaintiffs in the Spring of 1946 (R. 624625, 631-632). Moreton testified that he told Plaintiffs that
in ''ordinary and in other cases'' a 50% interest in claims
''had been given'' to patent ''unpatented claims in the
area'' (R. 624). He further testified that Plaintiffs refused
to give hin1 an interest of that size not\vithstanding that
they did not, according to ~{oreton, dispute that ''in ordinary and in other cases'' 50% had been given. In fact he testified that they refused to give him any more. than a onequarter interest (R. 625). Follo\ving such testimony, Defendants then asked the jury and now ask this Court, to
believe that Plaintiffs who, according to Moreton, were
unwilling to give Moreton any more than one-fourth in the
Spring of 1946, thereafter, for no reason sug·gested, became
willing to give him three-fourths.
On top of this inherent improbability, there is the fact
that Moreton was repeatedly and crushingly impeached
during his. performance on the witness stand at the trial.
For instance, Defendants describe an alleged statement
which Moreton testifie·d he made to Rex Holland and Rex'
answe·r thereto as follows: '' ~1:oreton told the co-owners
'I am making a big profit out of this transaction, as you
well kno",'", on the tonnage, and the 25¢ per ton', to which
statement Rex re,plied, 'I think you are'" (Dfts. Br. 79).
This conversation, Defendants claim (Dfts. Br. ·79-), was
never denied. But the fact of the matter is that it was completely and thoroughly denied, and it "'"as denied by Moreton
hin1self. Immediately after tlris testimony that Defendants
have quoted, Moreton \Yas confronted \Yith contradictory
testimony from his own deposition (R. 775 lines 26 to 29,
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r77 line 28 to 779 line 25)' and shortly thereafter broke
lown and completely and irrevocably impeached and de;,troyed himself when he testified ( R. 832) :

'' Q. Will you now tell me when it was that you
told the Hollands and Murie, for the very firs.t time,
that Columbia was paying 25 cents a ton for the
M & H claims? A. I never told them that at any
time.
"Q. You never told them? A. No."
Over and over again at the trial Moreton was similarly
embarrassed and impeached (R. 616-630, 664 line· 1 to 668
line 23, 669-673, 700-704, 775·-779, 781-788, 789, 831-832).
vV e mention this only to shO\V that More,ton 's testimony is
so absolutely unworthy of belief that the trial court could
not appropriately predicate any ruling upon it. Indeed, it
is res:pectfully submitted that any reliance placed on Moreton's te:stimony by the trial court must on this Record be
considered to have been an abuse of discretion.
We, of course, do not know that the trial court's action
was based on Moreton's testimony. However, we; further
respectfully submit, we do not know (since the court wrote
no opinion)-what else it could have been based on. We
can see no other basis. We submit there is none.
It has been said that ''The courts will not lightly seize
upon some small circumstance to deny relief to a party
plainly shown to have been defrauded" (Victor Oil Co.
v. Drum, 148 Cal. 226, 193 P. 243, 249, cited and quoted in
Adams v. Harrison, 93 P. 2d 237, 244) ye.t, we submit, in
this case relief was denied to parties plainly defrauded
without the showing of any circumstance for such denial.
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Defendants in their Brief talk about the deprivation of
constitutional rights (Dfts. Br. 94-100). But that complaint
could be more appropriately made by Plaintiffs, for the
action of the trial court in setting aside the verdict of
the jury and entering judgment for defendant ~Ioreton not\vithstanding the jury's verdict (all without explanation or
opinion and in the very teeth of a Record such as this)
actually amounts, in effect, to nothing less than an unwarranted deprivation of Plaintiffs' constitutional right to a
trial by jury.
It is respectfully submitted that the serious error of
the trial court in this case cannot be permitted to stand
and that the relief requested in our original brief should
be given.
Earnestly and sinceTely urging· all of the foregoing this
brief is
Re·spectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, RoBERTS
BRIGHAM
NICK

c.

E.

&

RoBERTS

SPANOS

WILLIAM JEROME PoLLACK

Counsel for Appellants
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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